In the i98os, the Supreme Court began to enforce agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. The cases involved arbitration agreements between businesses of roughly equal bargaining power. Businesses, however, seized on the judicial approval of arbitration of statutory claims and began to include arbitration agreements in contracts of adhesion with employees and consumers. Arbitration agreements deprive the parties of jury trials. They may limit discovery and other procedures available in court. Perhaps most importantly, they may limit the ability to bring a class action suit, rendering many smaller claims uneconomical. 1 With their long history of representing employees in arbitration, unions have an opportunity to provide representation for employees in these cases, enhancing their ability to enforce their legal rights. Private attorneys who represent employees are rarely attracted to individual arbitration cases because of the often limited potential for damages. In contrast, unions can offer representation as a benefit to recruit new employee members. Additionally, representation in arbitration can become part of a campaign against employer-imposed arbitration systems that limit the legal rights of employees. Accordingly, unions should explore cost-effecti\'e methods of providing such benefits to enhance workplace justice.
ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
For the employer, the arbitral forum offers certain advantages over litigation. It is not public, it is faster and often cheaper than litigation, and the case is not heard ' Sec, e.g by a jury, which may be more sympathetic to an employee than a business. There is some evidence that employers who are sued in arbitration more than once benefit as repeat players in the system. 2 Large employers have this advantage in both arbitration and litigation, although it is plausible that arbitrators may favor such employers if viewed as a source of repeat business. Over time, the employee bar has organized, which can balance the employer's repeat-player advantage for employees who use experienced employment lawyers. And, of course, the class action limitations are extremely valuable, particularly where the employees' claims are of low value individually but large value collectively.
3 Arbitration is not a panacea for employers, however. In litigation, many employment cases are decided in favor of the employer on summary judgment motions, before a trial is held. Motions for summary judgment are rare in arbitration, although evidence indicates their use is increasing. 4 Further, the arbitrator must be paid directly while judges are paid by the taxpayers. And the ability to appeal arbitration decisions is extremely limited, which is beneficial for the winner, but not the loser. 5 Also, because employee lawyers are likely to challenge arbitral agreements, they may result in costly enforcement litigation.
6 Tims there are some counterincentives for employers considering implementation of an arbitration agreement, but the net advantage is for employers.7 While most employer processes allow employees to choose their own representative, if only to ensure enforceability of the agreement, 8 Colvin & Pike's study of employment arbitration found that almost a third of employees in employer- Unions have existing expertise to assist workers in arbitration of legal claims. Most collective bargaining agreements require arbitration for contractual violations, and unions regularly arbitrate these claims. Thus, union lawyers and union representatives have extensive experience in the arbitral forum. While the employer-created arbitration forum will not be identical to labor arbitration, the experience will still be valuable.
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In addition, unions can balance the repeat-player effect that benefits employers in employment arbitration. Data on labor arbitration show relatively high union win rates. Union representation across a range of employment arbitrations should yield a pro-employee repeat-player effect or at least counterbalance the pro-employer effect where claimants are not represented by repeat players in the system. Arbitrators would be less likely to seek to curry favor with the employer knowing that unions will make selection decisions about the arbitrator in the future.
The Benefits for Unions
Even if unions can provide effective representation to employees in employerpromulgated arbitration, there must be an incentive for them to do so. That incentive comes in the form of increased potential for union membership, both initially from employees joining the union to obtain representation and in the long term, through building individual representation into majority representation in 553 collective bargaining units.' 3 Union membership has been declining for many years in the private sector. In the public sector, it has remained relatively steady. There are many explanations for the difference but one way that public-sector unions have retained membership, even in states where collective bargaining is illegal or limited, is by providing legal representation.'.f Representation in arbitration offers an immediate and tangible value to the employee that is also visible to other employees.'5 Unions can use the opportunity provided by representation to inform the employee(s) of other benefits of membership and representation such as union-sponsored training, collective bargaining agreements, "just cause" protection against discharge, and union representation on the job site. Preparation of employee witnesses for arbitration presents a chance for the client to connect with union members and staff and learn more about the union. Motivated employees who demonstrate leadership potential could be trained to organize and educate workers at the workplace or in the particular industry about the union and the benefits of representation. Indeed, particularly skilled individuals might even be trained to represent employees from their workplace in arbitration of similar claims. ' 6 While there is always the potential that an employee who loses in arbitration will blame the union, an effective advocate will educate employees about the risks of loss and demonstrate the value of representation, win or lose. Aclclitio11ally, representation in arbitration can and should be part of a broader campaign to challenge unfair arbitration provisions imposed by employers. ' 7 Another benefit to the union of representing workers in arbitration is ensuring enforcement of the law in all workplaces. Research has demonstrated that 13 In moving to majority representation, unions must be careful that their legal assistance complies with the restrictions of Steric) 'cle, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 6t (:011) , in order to avoid having a union representation election victory overturned unclcr the National Labor Relations Act. Steric)'cle bars union financing of litigation for employees between the filing of a petition for representation and the election unless the financing is a benefit of membership available to oll regardless of the election. 14 Sec, e.g., National Education Association, available at www.nea.org/homc/34718.htm; American Federation of Teachers, available at www.aft.org/about/membcr-benefits/aft-lcgal-and-financialscrviccs; Fraternal Order of Police, available at www.foplcgal.com/; Los Angeles Police Protective League, available at http://lapd.com/about/scrviccs/. 15 One difficulty with this strategy is that 1nany cases 1nay involve c1nployccs who have been tcnninatcd, limiting their continued contact with coworkers. Sec Colvin and Pike, supra notc-h at 13 (showing only ;% of 217 American Arbitration Association cases in 2008 involved employees who were still employed). It is possible, however, that the availability of union representation in arbitration may encourage more employees to bring claims while still employed.
A11n C. Hodges employees in unionized workplaces arc more likely to enforce their rights.
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To the extent that greater enforcement by union members is due to the absence of fear of retaliation because of the protection of a union contract, offering representation to workers in a nonunion facility may not necessarily increase enforcement. Another part of the explanation, however, is the union's education of workers about their rights and representational support in enforcing them. Thus, education and representation of workers in unorganized workplaces could result in greater enforcement of laws. Such enforcement will benefit unionized workers also, as their employers will not be threatened by nonunion competitors offering lower prices based on avoidance of legal compliance.
BARRIERS TO UNION REPRESENTATION IN ARBITRATION
While there are benefits to unions and unorganized employees from union representation in employer-imposed arbitration, there are also barriers that must be overcorne for such a system to provide employees greater access to justice. The three most significant issues are financing the program, bar requirements, and accountability with corresponding potentiality liability for the union. / Additionally, it is possible that once unions initiate such a program, employers could respond by limiting representation in arbitration.
Financing and Bar Requirements
The rnost immediate challenge is creating a financially viable program. If the union can use lay union representatives rather than attorneys, as it often does in contractual arbitration, the program will be cheaper. But bar requirements may limit the use of lay representatives in some jurisdictions. First, I will discuss other aspects of the program related to financing and then tum to the choice of representative. Public-sector unions maintain legal assistance programs for members and other bargaining unit employees because the value of the protection convinces many employees to join the organization, though few actually have to utilize the services.HJ In the private sector, unions will need to educate employees about the value of representation, for most are unaware of the difficulty of finding legal representation 18 Sec, e.g., David Weil, Employee Eights, Unio11s a11d the I111ple111entation of Labor l'olicies, i11 l'ROCEEDINCS OF TIIE FmnY-Fwrn ANNUAL MEETING, INDUS. REL. REs. Ass'N 474, .p6 (1993) (analyzing vnrious studies and concluding that unions improve enforcement of laws, including the Fair Labor Standards Act, OSHA, MSHA, certain provisions of ERISA, workers' compensation laws and unemployment compensation laws).
" 1 For teachers and police officers, the protection not only applies lo legal actions when their own job is tlucatcncd but also protection when legal action is taken against them by the public. Sec, e.g., Virginia
Education Ass'n, VEA for the arbitration of statutory claims and many will also fail to anticipate the need.
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If the union can only attract members once the need for representation arises, it will be difficult to construct a financially viable program. Additionally, dues must be set at a reasonable rate for employees to feel that they are worth the benefit offered. They will not be sufficient to cover any individual's costs of representation should it be needed, but should be adequate as a group to help defray the cost to the union. The design of the program will have a significant impact on costs. Unions will need to determine eligibility requirements, the scope of assistance, and the means of providing assistance. Eligibility requirements will affect costs by establishing when members are eligible to receive assistance and by limiting representation to viable claims. The scope of assistance will dramatically influence costs. Unions must decide whether all legal claims are covered or only particular claims, whether actions in court arc covered or only claims in arbitration, and what costs are covered, e.g., only the hearing representational costs or costs of discove1y, arbitrator fees, and other associated costs.
21 Unions must also decide whether they will represent employees in challenging biased arbitration programs in court, or only in the actual arbitration. Careful consideration of these options will help the union construct a financially viable program.
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There are several ways unions can provide representation in arbitration. Unions could use staff attorneys, outside counsel, or trained union representatives, or they could train employees for self-representation.
2 3 Alternatively, and perhaps most practical, an arbitration program could be a hybrid of these choices. Some complex cases may require counsel while simpler cases could REV. 915 (2001) (describing the importance of innovative mechanisms of service delivery, preventive lawyering, and high-quality representation in effective group legal services plans). Sec, e.g., Employee Benefits Research Institute, Fundamentals of Employee Benefits Plans 393-<)6 (6th cdn., 2009), available at www.cbri.org/pdf/publications/books/fundamcntalshoo9/39_Legal-Svcs _OTHER-BENS_Funds-2009_EBRl.pdf (describing the types of plans and limitations often built into legal services plans to contain costs). In addition, consultation with public sector unions, such as the National Education Association and its affiliates, and trade organizations such as Group Legal Services Association could be helpful in structuring viable cost-effective plans. Sec Group Legal Services Association, Join GLSA available at ht~i://glsaonlinc.org/attorneys/attorneys_-join-glsa/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) . -/ Ann C. Hodges be tried by union representatives or trained employees. 04 In particular, a series of cases that would otherwise be a class action might be tried initially by an attorney who could establish a pattern to be followed by union representatives or employees in later cases.
Financing will be affected in several ways by these choices. Staff attorneys will generally be cheaper than outside counsel, although in today's legal market, the union may be able to negotiate favorable fee arrangements with outside counsel.
25 Attorney fees may be available as a remedy in many cases. 26 Fees may be recovered at market rates, even for attorneys who are paid as staff attorneys, which would enable the union to use them to finance arbitration for other ernployees. 2 7 To comply with bar requirements, however, recovered fees should be segregated into a separate fund and used only for legal expenses.
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Using trained union representatives for some or all cases (subject to bar rules against unauthorized practice of law) would be even less expensive than attorneys and training employees for self-representation could be cheaper yet. Even where attorneys are used, trained union representatives could be used as paralegals in preparing the case, reducing the cost of representation and enabling recovery of fees for their services. Compton, 37 A.3cl 85 (R.I. 2012) . l11c court noted that some states explicitly allowed the practice while some had not acldressccl the issue, but the parties could not find any decisions that had prohibited union representatives from arbitrating contractual claims. 37 A.3d at 9Q--<)L See also CAL.Com: Crv. PRO. S1282 .. ~(h) (:1uthorizing non-lawyers to appear in arbitration under collective bargaining agrccmen ts). 35 is undertaken for compensation in the form of clues, as the program contemplates, as contrasted with representation by a friend, family member or coworker. Further, an employer who fears that union representation in arbitration may lead to unionization of the workforce may be motivated to report such representation to the bar. Uncertainty about the legal protection available to inadequately represented workers may trigger interest in invoking unauthorized practice of law restrictions. There is no easy answer to the question of when unauthorized practice of law occurs in arbitration. In contrast to labor arbitration cases, 36 the cases that would be covered by the proposed program will largely involve statutory claims. That they take place in the arbitral forum does not automatically place them outside the unauthorized practice of law prohibition. Such determinations depend on the law of the state. One question will be whether the state has allowed representation by either non-lawyers or out-of-state lawyers in arbitration, 37 which will depend on which state's law applies. 38 In some states, out-of-state attorneys may be able to do a few arbitrations per year without engaging in unauthorized practice or may be able to obtain admission pro !we vice for purposes of a particular case. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. S12fl24 (authorizing appearance b)' out-of-state attorneys in arbitrntions in California upon approval of the arbitrator after compliance with specified notice requirements). Sec also Minn. Stat. Ann. 481.02(5) (authorizing any bona fide labor organization lo give advice to its members on matters arising out of employment).
,~ Blankley, supra note 35, at 38-43. Some arbitrations may take place in a location other than where the dispute arose, and much of the preparation may take place in yet other jurisdictions, id., although that is probably less likely in workplace arbitrations. In the many jurisdictions that have adopted ABA Model Rule 5.5(c)(3), the questions are easier to answer for attorneys; the rule authorizes licensed attorneys to practice law temporarily in an ADR proceeding if their representation in the case is "reasonably related" to their practice in the jurisdiction where they are licensed. 4° For non-attorneys, however, or attorneys in other jurisdictions, the questions are more complex and require a careful evaluation of state law. Modification of bar rules to allow union representatives to represent their members in claims arising out of their employment would resolve this problem.
Union Liability Issues
An arbitration program will be effective in increasing access to justice only if unions provide the best possible representation, which requires some mechanism for accountability. Additionally, unions must factor the risk of liability into their calculation of whether to institute a program. Some cases will be lost, some workers will be unhappy, and some may bring legal action against the union. While setting realistic expectations regarding the outcome of arbitration will help, it is important to consider what legal claims might be available to dissatisfied workers.
If attorneys are used, ethical standards regarding representation will apply, and malpractice claims will lie against the lawyers who fail in their duty. The union can protect against such claims with malpractice insurance. When representing workers in arbitration under collective bargaining agreements, unions are governed by the duty of fair representation, which imposes liability for representation that is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 4' The duty of fair representation, however, is a judicially implied corollary of statutory grants of exclusive representation.+' Thus, the duty may not apply at all when the union is offering representation to employees who may choose instead to represent themselves because they are not a part of a majority bargaining unit. Employees remain free to choose alternative representation. "13 Whether or not the statutory duty of fair representation is applicable, negligent representation by a union might give rise to a common law claim of negligence.
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Regardless of the standard, however, there is some risk of liability for unions instituting such a program. Clarification of the accountability standard to be applied would encourage development of representation programs.
Employer Responses
Though current employer programs generally allow employees to choose their own representative and dispute resolution providers actively encourage such choice, employers concerned about union representation of their employees might respond by limiting employee representation choices in these unilaterally promulgated programs. To date limits on representation have not been one of the primary problems with arbitration, perhaps because the cost of representation imposes a natural limit. If employees begin to litigate small claims with union representation, however, representation limits may become a part of employer systems.
One way to challenge such limits would be through service providers such as the American Arbitration Association, which have rules allowing representation of choice and also rely on collectively bargained arbitration for business. 45 Because employment arbitration is unilaterally structured, however, employers could choose providers who would accept such limits. In those cases, legal challenges to representation limits would be necessary. Two possibilities for challenge are the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)'s protection of employee rights to engage in union and concerted activity and the due process and unconscionability bars to enforcement of unilaterally imposed arbitration agreements.
Any explicit limitation on the use of union representatives or attorneys alone would seem to run afoul of the employee's NLRA Section 7 right to engage in union activity. 46 
Union Re/iresentation in Employment Arbitration
representation in interviews that may lead to discipline, although this position has fluctuated across administrations:P The rationale of the most recent decision focused on both the need for confidentiality in investigations and the limited assistance that could be provided by coworkers as compared to union representatives. This decision might support an employer's denial of either union representation in the unorganized workplace or representation by co-employees. Professor Lofaso's suggestion of a statutory change in this ruling to enable union or coworker representation in arbitration would alleviate this problem. Alternatively, the NLRB might reach a different result in the more formal arena of arbitration where union representation is common in other workplaces. A second alternative would be to challenge limitations on representation as violative of clue process requirements since representation choice, at least legal representation, would be available in court. Limits on representation could prevent an employee from vindicating statutory rights. Under an unconscionability analysis, such limits also might be void, particularly if they applied only to the employee and not to the employer.-+ 8 Representation by laypersons, however, whether union representatives or fellow employees, is less susceptible to this argument, since it would not be possible in the judicial forum where most statutory claims covered by arbitration agreements would otherwise be tried. Finally, any limits on representation would provide fuel to a union-led legislative campaign to challenge unfair arbitration. To deprive employees of their right to litigate, confine them to an arbitration procedure designed by the employer, restrict their right to proceed as a class to reduce their costs, and then bar then1 from using cost-effective representation seems particularly egregious and might spark legislative action to create a fairer system for employees. rejecting argument that Section 7 gives employees in the nonunion workplace the right to coworker representation in disciplinary investigations, known as Weirzgarten rights, after the case that established the right in the unionized workplace. In Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. (1982 , the Board first found that nonunion employees had a right to coworker representation in disciplinary interviews, but that decision was overruled in Sears, Roebuck 6 Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230, 232 (1985) , which found that the NLRA compels the conclusion that nonunion employees have no Wei11garte11 rights. E. I. DuPont de Nemours, 289 N.L.R.B. 627, 630-31 (1988) rejected the Sears rationale but decided that the proper balancing of employer and employee rights required limiting Weingarten rights to unionized employees. Despite court enforcement, 876 f.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1989) The reduction in unionization and the advent of compulsory employrnent arbitration, combined with the Supreme Court's enforcement of virtually any arbitration agreement, have reduced access to justice for employees despite the existence of many laws designed to protect them from abusive employer practices. Uniom, which remain the most powerful employee protective organizations despite their loss of membership, could improve access to justice and increase their membership by developing a program of representation in arbitration for union members in unorganized workplaces. A creative, carefully designed progran1 could meet the needs of both unions and employees, improving enforcement of laws to the benefit of all workers.
